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RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0111
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0868
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0060
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 0107
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 9835
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0660
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0107
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 0105
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0474
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0025
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RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 0055
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RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0235
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0230
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000943

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN AND EUR/AGS
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017

TAGS: IR KNNP PARM RS GM

SUBJECT: GERMANY EXERCISING VIGILANCE AND RESTRAINT WHEN
CONSIDERING TRAVEL OF UNSC DESIGNATED IRANIANS TO OR
THROUGH THEIR TERRITORY

REF: STATE 61222

Classified By: Global Affairs Counselor Donald R. Shemanski, for reason
s 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Global Affairs officer delivered ref demarche to Desk
Officer Mirko Schilbach of the German MFA's UN Policy
Division May 9. Schilbach was not aware that Russia had
admitted Iranian General Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, whose travel
is sanctioned under UNSCR 1747, entry into Russia in early
April. He said he would share the information with
appropriate members of the German Government.

¶2. (C) In response to our question about air travel between
Germany and Iran, Schilbach said that Germany's Lufthansa and
Iran's Iran Air have regularly scheduled flights between the
two countries. Schilbach noted that after the December 2006
passage of UNSCR 1737 Germany increased its vigilance over
travelers from Iran to ensure that no sanctioned individuals
could enter the country. In addition, Schilbach said, the
EU, after adopting its Common Position on implementing UNSCR
1737 sanctions, created its own list of individuals from Iran
who should be denied entry into any EU member. Germany
abides by this EU list, Schilbach added.

¶13. (C) Schilbach described the screening process to prevent sanctioned individuals from entering Germany. First, he said that Iran Air requires all passengers to Germany to have a valid visa before boarding their airplane. In case a sanctioned individual applies for a visa, Germany would deny it, so the individual should not even be able to board a plane bound for Germany, Schilbach said. If Iran Air mistakenly flies a passenger without a valid visa to Germany, then Iran Air has to return that passenger and pay a substantial fine to the German Government, according to Schilbach.

¶14. (C) Schilbach cited the possibility of a sanctioned individual possessing a valid visa that was issued before the sanctions were implemented. Even though Iran Air could allow that individual to board an airplane for Germany, German immigration officials would deny him entry into the country. Schilbach noted that Germany performs an immigration check on every passenger arriving from Iran. Sanctioned individuals, even with a pre-sanctions visa, would be denied entry. Schilbach noted that many Iranians still receive visas, but they come for legitimate purposes, such as for authorized trade and visiting relatives in Germany.

¶15. (C) Concerning Russia's admittance of Zolqadr, Schilbach said it was unhelpful, despite the Russian notification to the UN Sanctions Committee, as stipulated in UNSCR 1737. In Schilbach's view, Russia should not have given Iran the opportunity to exploit Zolqadr's visit for propaganda

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purposes. He also said Russia bears some responsibility for ensuring that the sanctions on Iran were not tougher. It is because the UN sanctions were "softer" than the Europeans preferred that the EU added its own sanctions on certain Iranians and also banned the export of certain items to Iran, Schilbach said.

¶16. (C) When asked about the possibility of discussing the Zolqadr visit with any Russian officials in Germany, Schilbach said he had no contacts with the Russian Embassy. He suggested that perhaps colleagues of his could discuss this visit with Russian counterparts but otherwise offered nothing definite.

¶17. (C) Concerning sanctions on Iran, Schilbach said the German Government "has heard" that future sanctions on Iran, if made too tough, will actually prompt a majority of the Iranian population to rally around its leadership. Schilbach did not elaborate on the source of this information. He said the ideal solution is to find the right balance between sanctions that pressure the Iranian government into complying with the IAEA without driving the Iranian population to the government's side. He had no suggestions on what that balance might be.

¶18. (SBU) Post will report septel any other significant German reaction to the issue of considering travel by UNSC-designated Iranians.

TIMKEN JR